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Evolution of Catholic Marriage 
Morality in the Twentieth Century 
from a Baby-Making Contract to a 
Love-Making Covenant - Part II: 
Code of Cannon Law to Vatican II
Edward Collins Vacek S.J.
Abstract
Sexual ethics in the West has been evolving, in practice and in theory, over 
the last century. The official Catholic Church teaching was challenged by many 
Christian churches and by the changing culture of the West. The Vatican insisted 
that no change could be made in its timeless truths. Nevertheless, each challenge 
required ever more sophisticated and convoluted arguments. The impetus for 
change came through the Western shift from seeing sexual activity as a procreative 
act toward viewing it as a way for husbands and wives (and gradually also any 
consenting adult) to express and deepen love. The Second Vatican Council accepted 
this new view, but subsequently the official teaching became more strict, insisting 
that both procreation and marital love-making must be present. The teaching of 
Pope Paul VI prohibiting contraception was the proverbial straw that broke the 
camel’s back for many Catholics. They abandoned the official teaching, recognizing 
that it was the new personalist view itself that complicated the meaning of mar-
riage. Subsequently, the Canon Law tried reestablish the validity of loveless sex in 
marriage–the dominant view through the centuries. That move was rejected.
Keywords: sexual ethics, marriage, birth control, covenant, Canon law, Pius XI,  
Pius XII, Paul VI, Vatican II
1. Background introduction
The official teaching of the Catholic Church on sexuality evolved significantly 
during the twentieth century. The Church encountered rapidly changing under-
standings of sexuality among both secular and religious groups. Church teachings, 
Charles Taylor observes, had been “connected with the denigration of sexuality, 
horror at the Dionysian, fixed gender roles” and involved an “unfortunate fusion 
of Christian sexual ethics with certain models of the ‘natural.’ ”1 From 1917 to 2000, 
the Church monumentally changed the foundations of its sexual and marital ethic. 
1 Charles Taylor, “Sex and Christianity: How has the Moral Landscape Changed?” Commonweal 134, no. 
16 [September 18, 2007], 16. Notes for Church documents at end.
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But it tried not to revise the specific norms based on those foundations. Painting 
with broad strokes, we can say that the “people of God” welcomed the change of 
foundations but did not accept many norms commonly taught as absolutes by the 
“Church.” The result is the current disjunction between what the “Church” teaches 
and what the “pilgrim people of God” think and practice.2
There is a long, rather discontinuous pattern of changes in the sexual eth-
ics of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. The Hebrew Bible (Old Testament) had an 
enormous amount of variations, many of which Christians no longer accept. The 
New Testament changed the ideal, mainly because Jesus was most likely celibate. 
Augustine, after a long sexually active history, again shifted to a more conserva-
tive restriction by legitimating procreative sex to be mainly a remedy for sin and a 
measure that would hasten the end of the world. Thomas Aquinas again took a less 
censorious approach, while Martin Luther revised significantly the meaning of 
matrimonial ethics. As the twentieth century approached, a shifting understanding 
of marriage led to the major changes the Catholic Church resisted and approved in 
its sexual ethic.
Jonathan Haidt’s The Righteous Mind provides a hermeneutical key for under-
standing the changes in sexual ethics during the last century. First he offers (in an 
overstated way) psychological evidence that human beings typically start with their 
convictions and tend to find reasons to justify those convictions only when they 
encounter or anticipate challenge. The Church in the twentieth century began with 
many conclusions, for example, that women cannot be ordained. When challenged 
by culture and by scholars who showed that its older arguments against women’s 
ordination were either weak or unjust, the Church did not change its normative 
position, but sought for new foundational justifications. Haidt demonstrates that 
this procedure is not unusual among human beings.3 Indeed, the habit for this kind 
of thinking is deeply ingrained in theological method. Church teaching often claims 
that it begins with the givens of Scripture and tradition and then theology explains 
and defends what those sources teach. Fides quaerens intellectum. In fact, theology 
often changes in response to new insights, as the Church’s teachings on slavery or 
women indicate. The current question was whether new intuitions and changing 
arguments should change the Church’s sexual norms.
Second, Haidt tested six loosely-drawn moral concerns that illuminate similari-
ties and differences between so-called conservatives and liberals. Both tend to share 
a strong concern for compassion, a concern for fairness, and a concern for liberty. 
But conservatives tend also to be much more concerned about authority, loyalty, 
and sanctity.4
Debates over the Church’s sexual teaching have greatly foundered due to these 
latter three concerns. Moral theologian, Richard McCormick, S.J., said that it 
seldom took more than five minutes after he gave public lectures on sexual matters 
before the topic turned to authority and loyalty to the Church. Criticism of Church 
teaching has often been felt as a rejection of God’s authority. Loyalty and authority 
are important since their psychosocial functions is to bring people into cooperation, 
to highlight the binding quality of morality, and to provide group identity. Hence 
2 In this essay, I use the term “Church” in its conventional (and not theological) sense simply as short-
hand for the official teaching by the Vatican. I do not intend to imply a division between the hierarchy 
and “people of God.” Like the term “the faithful,” such a division unfortunately suggests that members of 
the hierarchy are not part of the people of God or are not faithful. Furthermore, there is hardly complete 
agreement on sexual matters by the individuals and groups who are part of the “people of God.”
3 Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion [New York: 
Pantheon, 2012], 74.
4 Haidt, Righteous Mind, op. cit., 182–83.
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moral disagreement is not only about a concern for truth, but also a concern for the 
identity and unity of the Body of Christ. For the first half of the twentieth century, 
the Church’s marital ethic functioned analogously to its prohibition of meat on 
Friday in that it provided a distinctly Catholic identity. Still, as the comparison sug-
gests, the basis for moral requirements proper to sexual activity must be different 
from merely being matters of authority or communal loyalty.
Haidt’s last concern, sanctity, is more directly relevant to Judaeo-Christian 
sexual morality. He describes sanctity as a need to be purified from stain and pol-
lution. The Old Testament expresses great concern about sexual pollution. Sanctity 
refers to areas of life that are thought to be beyond touch or change. Through 
history, under the influence of the rubric of sanctity, descriptions of sexual activity 
commonly teeter between, on the one side, shame and dirt, and, on the other side, 
reverence and sacredness.5 In this vein, Church teaching often suggests that those 
who fail to follow the Church’s sexual norms engage in mere selfish pleasure-seeking 
or base animal activity while those who follow the Church’s sexual norms express a 
supreme love.6 Put another way, sexual norms are absolute in the sense that they are 
beyond free human alteration. Any activity that does not conform to these absolutes 
involves pollution and stain.
In what follows, this essay will trace the development of official Catholic teach-
ing throughout the twentieth century. It begins with the Code of Canon Law. The 
Code is an important marker against which the progress of the Church’s subsequent 
teaching can be readily seen. Well into the second half of the twentieth century, 
moral theology textbooks used its ideas as the basis for their treatment of the sixth 
commandment. As will be seen, even after the Church changed its basic under-
standing of marriage, it returned to the ideas of this early Code in order to prohibit 
practices that now seemed plausible in the new understanding.
2. Code of Canon Law
The 1917 Code of Canon Law lays down the lineaments of the Church’s tra-
ditional understanding of marriage. The Code makes several terse assertions 
about the abstract nature of marriage, almost all of which were challenged as the 
twentieth century zigzagged down the decades. The Code begins with the asser-
tion that marriage is 1] a contract, 2] which Christ made a sacrament. The Code 
lists 3] one primary, but twofold end of marriage, namely, 3a] the procreation 
and 3b] the education of children. After that it lists 4] one secondary end, which 
5 Haidt, Righteous Mind, 146–47; Max Scheler, “Über Scham und Schamgefühl,” Schriften aus dem 
Nachlass, vol. 1, 2nd ed. [Bern: Franke Verlag, 1957], 65–152; L. William Countryman, Dirt, Greed, and 
Sex: Sexual Ethics in the New Testament and their Implications for Today [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1988]; Paul Ricoeur, “Wonder, Eroticism, and Enigma,” Sexuality and the Sacred, ed. James Nelson & 
Sandra Longfellow [Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox, 1993], 80–84; also José Noriega, “Eros 
and Agape in Conjugal Life: The Mystery of Conjugal Charity,” Josephinum Journal of Theology, 18 no. 2 
[Summer/Fall 2011]: 357; Levio Melina, “The Body and its Vocation to Love in the Catechesis of John Paul 
II,” Josephinum Journal of Theology, 18 no. 2 [Summer/Fall 2011]: 342.
6 For example, recently Livio Melina writes: “contraception introduces into the bodily act of the recipro-
cal gift between a man and a woman the poison of a lie, which intimately falsifies the act, making it a 
self-gift that does not give completely, a receiving that does not really accept. It can truly be said that the 
contraceptive act is no longer a conjugal act: its objective intentional structure is no different from forms 
of sexual activity aimed only at hedonistic individual satisfaction, incapable of building true personal 
communion.” See, “From Humanae Vitae to Deus Caritas Est: Developments in the Theological Thought 
on Human Love,” Josephinum Journal of Theology, 18 no. 2 [Summer/Fall 2011]: 369.
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likewise is twofold, namely, 4a] “mutual help” and 4b] “allaying of concupis-
cence.” Lastly, marriage has two “essential properties,” which are 5] “unity” and 6] 
“indissolubility.”
In general, a contract is an agreement of wills between two or more parties. The 
nature of this consent is laid out by the Code in exact form: “Matrimonial consent 
is an act of the will by which each party gives and accepts a perpetual and exclusive 
right over the body, for acts which are themselves suitable for the generation of 
children” [1917: 1081.2].7 The Code presupposes that the marriage contract is not 
subject to negotiation. People are free to enter or not into marriage, but they are 
not free to alter the rights and obligations of this institution. This contract is not 
structured primarily for the individual needs of the spouses but for producing 
children for the species.
According to the Code, spouses consent to give and accept a right to use the 
other’s body for purposes of sexual activity. In this, it follows St. Paul: “the wife 
does not have authority over her own body, but the husband does; likewise the 
husband does not have authority over his own body, but the wife does” [1 Cor. 7:4]. 
Once married, spouses must, if asked, pay the marital “debt” of sexual intercourse. 
Spouses do not have the authority to say, “No.” In this sense, marital rape is not 
possible.
Contracts typically focus chiefly on behaviors and not on the interior attitudes 
that became so important in personalist philosophies later in the century. In the 
Code it is not necessary, for validity of the contract, that the spouses have any 
affection for one another. Indeed, spouses can get married even though they live in 
different countries and have not previously met.8 This is not to say that the Church 
encouraged loveless marriage. For example, Pope Leo XIII earlier wrote that spouses 
“are bound, namely, to have such feelings for one another as to cherish always very 
great mutual love” [1880: 11; L:6] [1]. But such love is not necessary for the validity 
of the contract.
One major reason why mutual love is not necessary for marriage is due to the 
influence of the Pauline writings. While there is a precedent for a connection 
between marriage and love in Ephesians [5: 25–32], the love urged there is not 
mutual.9 More importantly, few if any biblical texts have shaped Christian sexual 
ethics as much as 1 Corinthians 6–7. This text tends to make sex and love incompat-
ible bedfellows. Paul said that a husband should relate to his wife as if he had no 
wife [1 Cor. 7: 29]. Augustine reinforced this attitude: “Thus it is characteristic 
of a good Christian to love in one woman the creature of God whom he desires to 
be transformed and renewed, but to hate corruptible and mortal intimacy and 
7 Throughout this essay, references to Church documents will be made in the text itself. The online sites 
where these documents can be found are listed in the bibliography. Usually, in references to Church 
documents, I will add an “L.” The “L” in the citation refers to translations made by Odile M. Liebard, 
Love and Sexuality: Official Catholic Teachings [Wilmington, NC: McGrath Publishing, 1978]. Liebard’s 
numbering often makes it easier to locate exact citations, since Liebard numbers each paragraph. 
Unfortunately, he does so consecutively in a way that makes later documents begin their numbering with 
the next number after the last number in the previous document.
8 This is still true; see the current Code of Canon Law, [1983: 1104.1]; Ladislas Örsi, S.J., Marriage in 
Canon Law: Texts and Comments, Reflections and Questions [Wilmington, DL: Michael Glazier, 1986], 
52–53.
9 Ephesians’ recommendation [5:21–33] of mutuality, when spelled out, holds only that husbands should 
love their wives, in imitation of Christ’s love for the Church and, curiously, as a form of loving their own 
bodies, but that wives should obey and respect their husbands.
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copulation–that is, to love the human being in her creaturehood but to hate that 
which makes her a wife.”10
The Code makes a specifically theological claim that “Christ our Lord elevated 
the very contract of marriage between baptized persons to the dignity of a sacra-
ment” [1917: 1012.1]. It is now widely recognized that this is not a historically true 
statement.11 Still, after Trent, this claim is asserted to be theologically true, with the 
hazard that theological truth and historical truth follow separate paths. A further 
divergence appears in that the biblical Jesus and St. Paul recommend celibacy 
in sacramental terms, but the Church has chosen not to make vowed celibacy a 
sacrament.12
The Code draws a not-obvious conclusion from Christ’s elevation of marriage: 
“Therefore it is impossible for a valid contract of marriage between baptized 
persons to exist without being by that fact a sacrament” [1917: 1012.2].13 This 
contention leads to some severe problems, which make church law foreign to the 
intuitions of most people. First, although most Protestant Churches deny that 
marriage is a sacrament, the Catholic Church teaches that Protestants who marry in 
fact receive the sacrament in spite of their sincere intention or adamant determina-
tion not to receive a sacrament. Second, the Church teaches that Catholics who 
are baptized but no longer believe are simply unable to get married, even though 
everyone has a right to get married. On the one hand, they will not and should not 
ask the Church to marry them, since they no longer believe. On the other hand, 
their attempt to marry civilly outside of the Church is invalid. Such people, as well 
as all those around them, likely think they are married, but the Church says they are 
in fact fornicating. Well-known canonist Ladislaus Orsy, S.J., describes these results 
as “absurd.”14
Central to the Code is its natural law view of marriage’s purposes. Activities are 
distinguished by the ends or goals they pursue. “The primary end of marriage is 
the procreation and education of children; its secondary end is mutual help and the 
allaying of concupiscence” [1917: 1013.1]. It should be noted that neither the flour-
ishing of the individual spouses nor their personal communion are ends of mar-
riage. Behind the Code’s teaching on the primacy of procreation are the theologies 
of Augustine and Aquinas. For them, sexual activity was directed to the continu-
ance of the species, not to the good of the spouses. In fact, Augustine thought that 
sexual activity was usually immoral, though excused by the good of procreation. 
Thomas developed a rather complete theology of marriage out of the nature of 
sperm. For him, unlike other bodily fluids, sperm is not directed to the man’s good. 
10 Augustine, The Lord’s Sermon on the Mount in Ancient Christian Writers [Westminster, MD: Newman, 
1948], bk. 1, ch. 15, #41.
11 Örsi, Marriage in Canon Law, 53.
12 St Paul [1 Cor. 7] recommended celibacy instead of marriage. When Paul comments that a wife will 
be anxious to please her husband, he does not see this desire to please as an expression of love. Rather, 
he interprets it as an occasion for her to turn away from the Lord. The unmarried are described as holy 
in both body and spirit, while the married are those concerned about the things of the world. In other 
words, Paul’s advice in First Corinthians does not present marriage as a central relationship where love of 
God and marital love of neighbor unite.
13 The “therefore” seems to be a reverse reading of history. For much of history prior to Trent, Christians 
got married without thinking of marriage as one of Christ’s sacraments. When then the Church decided 
that marriage was a sacrament, it became necessary to say that all those previous marriages had been 
sacraments even if people were not aware of receiving a sacrament. See Joseph Martos, “Marriage: A 
Historical Survey,” Perspectives on Marriage: A Reader, Kieran Scott & Michael Warren, eds., 3rd ed. [New 
York: Oxford, 2007], 60.
14 Örsi, Marriage in Canon Law, 56.
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Rather, sperm is designed by God to continue the species. Thomas then justifies the 
long-term bond of marriage because the education of children takes many years and 
women are not naturally capable of doing that task alone.15
Marriage, according to the Code, has a two-part secondary end. This end is to 
remedy the spouses’ insufficiencies and evil tendencies. The first part is “mutual 
help,” which refers to tasks that need to be done in the ordinary course of living, 
e.g., laundry. The focus is on deeds, not on sharing personal life with the spouse. 
The second part says that people get married in order to remedy concupiscence. For 
St. Paul [1 Cor 7:2, 5, 8, 36], marriage is a solution to the problem of lust. Similarly, 
Aquinas held that marriage is a sacrament because it is a remedy against sin.16 
Luther memorably opined, “The temptation of the flesh has become so strong and 
consuming that marriage may be likened to a hospital for incurables which prevents 
inmates from falling into graver sins.”17
While the primary and secondary ends of marriage focused respectively on 
the child and on the limitations and problems of spouses, the essential proper-
ties of marriage, which are “unity” and “indissolubility,” name characteristics of 
marriage as an institution [1917: 1013.2]. “Unity,” in the mind of the Code, like 
fides in Augustine,18 is not the same as love. Rather, it is a negative term, meaning 
exclusivity. It forbids sexual activity with anyone other than one’s lawful spouse. 
“Indissolubility” likewise is negative: it forbids divorce. It is said to acquire “a 
peculiar firmness in Christian marriage by reason of its sacramental character.” 
The Code had to add a qualification like “peculiar firmness” because from its very 
beginning the Church has dissolved indissoluble marriages. The Church–due to the 
pressure of real life difficulties, the Pauline privilege, the Matthean exception for 
porneia, the distinction between ratum and consummatum, and the Petrine privi-
lege–altered any absoluteness deriving from Jesus’s prohibition of divorce. Because 
of these exceptions, the vast majority of all indissoluble marriages in the world 
are, in principle, dissolvable. Throughout much of the twentieth century, pressure 
within the Church for further exceptions increased, often masquerading under the 
rubric of annulments.
It can be noted in passing, though the point is significant, that procreation 
is given as the purpose of marriage, not the purpose of sexual intercourse. 
Subsequently, there arose a focus on the specific nature of sexual act and of how 
it itself might be violated. Thus birth control even outside marriage eventually 
became an intrinsically evil act. Subsequently, this allowed the Church to teach 
that while, for good reasons, it was no violation of marriage to be infertile, it was 
a violation of sex to prevent it from being fertile. Similarly, there is no assertion of 
any inseparability between procreation and love since love was not necessary for the 
validity of a marriage.
Christians should not live by legal codes alone, and so it was important for 
theologians and the papacy to develop theologies of marriage during the rest of the 
twentieth century. More sensitive to communal reception and pastoral practice, 
such theologies progressively modified official Church teaching.
15 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. Vernon J. Bourke [Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame: 1975], bk. 3. ch. 122. Nevertheless it should be noted that Aquinas also describes a sweet friend-
ship that grows between the spouses.
16 For Aquinas, friendship and mutual help that are part of marriage belong not to its pre-lapsarian 
essence nor to its sacramental quality, but to its institution in civil law. ST 3:42.1–2.
17 Martin Luther, Luther’s Works, vol. 44 [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1966], 9.
18 Augustine: Against Julian in Fathers of the Church [New York: Fathers of the Church, 1957], bk. 3, ch. 
16, # 30.
7
Evolution of Catholic Marriage Morality in the Twentieth Century from a Baby-Making...
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.95101
3. Pius XI
The winds of the twentieth century were pushing against the wall of tradition. 
In response, Pius XI devoted an important encyclical, Casti connubii, to the topic of 
marriage. He resists some changes but welcomes others. Along with his predecessor 
Leo XIII, he still holds that, in things like marriage and sex, it is “more useful and 
salutary” that they “remain in their natural state, unimpaired and unchanged.” God 
knows best, and only the wickedness of men would try to change this natural order 
[1930: 95; 1880: 25] [2]. Crucially, the pope holds that this order “is entirely inde-
pendent of the free will of man” [1930: 6]. In this view, marriage is not an institu-
tion that humans through “trial and error” devised to meet certain needs and that 
might change when those needs change. The underlying image of marriage is that of 
entering an institution that has established rules and purposes. One cannot change 
these rules and purposes. And, once inside the institution, one cannot choose to 
leave.
Pius XI upholds the absolute sexual prohibitions that have been the hard core 
of Church teachings in the area of sexuality: “Since, therefore, the conjugal act is 
destined primarily by nature for the begetting of children, those who in exercis-
ing it deliberately frustrate its natural power and purpose sin against nature and 
commit a deed which is shameful and intrinsically vicious” [1930: 54]. The probable 
background for these claims is, on the one hand, “sanctity” concerns surrounding 
sexuality and, on the other, the historical connection often made between contra-
ception and murder, since both are understood to be against “life.” The Church does 
not explain why sexual aberrances are “intrinsically vicious” or “intrinsically evil.” 
In Church teaching few acts other than genital acts are placed in this category. For 
example, inspite of Genesis 3:16, there has been no prohibition of anesthesia during 
childbirth, Caesarian sections, or subsequent wet-nursing. To say that some acts are 
intrinsically evil is to say there are no exceptions. It renders needless any consider-
ation of the particulars of real situations. That is, some acts are wrong, no matter 
how much good they might bring about or how much evil, for example, the death of 
a wife, they might prevent [1930: 61].
Nevertheless, contrary to this absolutism, the pope makes two strange conces-
sions. Pastorally, he proposes that when one spouse is practicing contraception, the 
other spouse is guiltless as long as that spouse does not formally consent to the sin 
[1930: 59].19 For moral theologians, this should be an astounding claim. In no other 
area of life is such immediate and indispensable cooperating in serious sin allowed. 
In allowing this exception, which goes back to Augustine,20 the rights and duties of 
marriage override the strictness of moral theory.
Pius XI makes a second adaptation that had implications that occupied theo-
logians through much of the rest of the twentieth century. Augustine held that 
sexual intercourse when procreation could not happen was sinful.21 Instead, Pius XI 
wrote that, although the “conjugal act is destined primarily by nature” for beget-
ting children, it is not against this nature to engage in sexual intercourse when, due 
to “natural reasons either of time or certain defects,” no children can be begotten 
[1930: 59]. Around the time of this encyclical, the menstrual cycle of women was 
being better understood. That new understanding laid the biological basis for the 
rhythm method and later for natural family planning. Pius proposed that, even 
19 The concession is repeated in the Pastoral Council for Families document, “Vademecum for 
Confessors,” [1997: III.13].
20 Augustine, Letters, vol. 5 [New York: Fathers of the Church, 1956], #262.
21 Augustine, Catholic and Manichaean Ways of Life [Washington: Catholic University of America, 1966], 
2.18.65.
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though sexual activity cannot achieve its reason for existing, it is permissible. Thus, 
an opening was made that there is no necessary moral connection between mar-
riage, sex, and procreation. As a result of this concession, countless trees have been 
felled for books and articles debating the issues that opened up. More importantly, 
countless lives have been thrown into religious and moral turmoil.
Pius XI points to the secondary ends of sexual intercourse as justification for 
engaging in sex when it cannot achieve its primary end. When he does so, however, 
he adds a new secondary end: the “cultivating of mutual love,” which, he says, goes 
beyond “mutual help.” He then draws a revolutionary implication: the “mutual 
inward molding of husband and wife. .. can in a very real sense. .. be said to be the 
chief reason and purpose of marriage” [1930: 23–24]. He says that the traditional 
view that marriage is primarily for procreation is itself only a restricted sense of 
marriage. In its fuller sense, marriage is for “mutual interchange and sharing” 
[1930: 24]. Then, perhaps for the first time in official Catholic teaching, he describes 
sexual intercourse as “the cultivating of mutual love” [1930: 59].
When describing this love, however, Pius XI reverts back to that strand of the 
tradition that insists that such love includes no seeking of one’s own advantage but 
only the good of the other, much as Christ loves the Church [1930: 23]. Throughout 
much of the century, Church descriptions of love tend to use terms such as self-
sacrifice or self-gift. That people get married and engage in sexual activity also as 
a form of self-love or to receive love has only gradually been admitted. Fulfilling 
a basic human drive has usually been described negatively as concupiscence and 
lust. Church teaching during the early part of the century offered little affirma-
tion that seeking pleasure can be healthy and normal. More importantly, there 
was little awareness that sexual intercourse is a “pleasure-bond” that contributes 
greatly to holding loving marriages together.22  Western culture has come to affirm 
openly that marriage is a central locus of eros and philia or mutual love.23 Gradually, 
without denying the place of self-sacrifice and the importance of agape, the Church 
has accepted this view of marriage.
4. Pius XII
The enormous cultural changes of the twentieth century in the Western 
world made more urgent the question why people should simply follow nature. 
Developments in biology and medicine changed the so-called natural order 
and enhanced human life. The control made possible by science abetted the 
Enlightenment’s emphasis on human freedom. A growing sense of personal dignity 
made it unseemly to describe marriage as an agreement to use another’s body as a 
means to make babies and to temper lust. Similarly, it seemed dualistic to speak 
of “using” one’s own body. Reacting against these and other challenges, Pius XII 
reasserted a natural law foundation for marriage and devised new characteristics to 
proscribe recent medical possibilities. According to the pope,
“In forming man, God regulated each of his functions, assigning them to the 
various organs.. .. God fixed, prescribed, and limited the use of each organ. He 
cannot allow man now to arrange his life and the functions of his organs accord-
ing to his own taste, in a manner contrary to the intrinsic and immanent function 
assigned them. Man, in truth, is not the owner of his body nor its absolute lord, 
22 William H. Masters and Virginia E. Johnson, The Pleasure Bond [New York: Bantam, 1974].
23 For the development of these three distinct types of love, see Edward C. Vacek, S.J., Love, Human and 
Divine: The Heart of Christian Ethics [Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 1994].
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but only its user. A whole series of principles and norms derives from this fact” 
[1944; L: 204] [3].
This text again sets down biological nature as the basis for the Church’s teaching 
in sexual morality. By identifying the work of God and the work of nature, the Pope 
implied that any direct interference with or alteration of our bodily nature is in fact 
a direct rejection of God’s work. But, since the Church allowed such interference in 
all of the rest of creation, even though God is also the “owner” of such creatures, it 
became clear that the only area off-limits to human intervention was human nature. 
Again, since the Church came to allow considerable interference in all the organs of 
the human body, except the sexual organs, it became clear that the ban on changing 
nature was restricted solely to human sexual organs. For example, while artificial 
insemination is permissible in other animals, for human beings “In the case of 
artificial insemination one should not only keep a very cautious reserve,” but also 
one “must exclude it altogether.” This is so, even though it would enable the couple 
to achieve the primary end of their sexual organs and of marriage [1949; L: 256; 
1951: 318] [4, 5].
Pius XII uses the same biologistic argument against contraception. He repeats 
his predecessor’s claim that, no matter how grave the consequences, it is wrong 
to “deprive this [marital] act of its inherent force or to impede the procreation of 
new life” [1951; L: 288, 291]. Thus, direct sterilization, even when the removal of 
a woman’s ovaries might protect her from a life-killing pregnancy, was completely 
forbidden. Her sexual organs do not exist for her good but “for the conservation 
of the human race” [1951; L: 300]. She is not allowed to change the function of 
her organs “in a manner contrary to the intrinsic and immanent function assigned 
them.” Still, indirect sterilization, such as in the removal of cancerous ovaries, was 
permitted to save her life [1951: 45]. Here compassion wins out.
Like his predecessor, Pius XII held that it is permissible for spouses to restrict 
sexual activity to infertile periods. Remarkably, he added that for good reasons, 
such as eugenics or health, spouses may choose to avoid procreation for the entire 
duration of their marriage, even though, again, this practice seems to undermine 
the primary purpose of marriage. He holds that persons can make the decision not 
to procreate even in advance of getting married [1951; L: 296, 298]. One could sur-
mise that it was becoming clearer that marriage was a great good, quite apart from 
procreation. Catholic authors explain this seeming exception by insisting on an “in-
principle” view of marriage and sexual activity.24  Both are essentially procreative, 
even when they actually cannot or morally ought not be procreative.
Other authors, embracing personalist philosophy, pressed the Church to include 
a greater emphasis on the person in its sexual teaching. They argued that sexual inti-
macy, “the expression and actuation of the personal and affection union,” is equal 
to procreation or independent of it [1951; L: 310–314].25 Against that view, Pius XII 
insists that marriage “is not ordered by the will of the Creator towards the personal 
perfection of the husband and wife as its primary end, but to the procreation and 
education of a new life.. .. This principle holds good for all marriages, even if they 
are unfruitful” [1951; L: 312]. He holds that all that is profound in married love 
should be at the service of the children, such that complete self-sacrifice of their 
own needs is demanded of the spouses [1951; L: 314, 316]. The Pope cryptically 
24 Dennis Hollinger, “Good Sex: Its Meaning and Morals,” in Moral Issues and Christian Reponses, 8th 
edition, ed. Patricia Beattie Jung and L. Shannon Jung [Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2013], 122–26.
25 In 1944, the Roman Rota had taken up a new theological challenge from personalism, namely, that 
“the evolution and perfection” of the husband and wife is not secondary but a primary end of mat-
rimony.” In response, it said: “These newcomers to matrimonial matters stray from true and certain 
doctrine” Acta Apostolicae Sedis 36 [1944], 103.
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added that if God had wanted sex to be primarily about mutual love, God would not 
have designed the sexual act the way God created it [1951; L: 328].
Nevertheless, Pius XII introduced somewhat of a personalist argument in 
response to those who were arguing that artificial insemination would in fact enable 
some spouses to fulfill the procreative purpose of marriage. Pius argued that if 
all God desired was the “union of two life-germs,” God would not have devised 
nature so that procreation requires the “personal cooperation” of the husband and 
wife [1951; L: 318]. Indeed, Pius’s theology gradually shifted to allow personalist 
concerns to play a greater role in the Church’s theology of marriage. For example, he 
describes a child as “the true and complete expression of [spouses’] reciprocal love” 
[1956; L: 500]. Then, making a novel addition to the tradition, he set out the precur-
sor to what became for Paul VI the inseparability principle: “Never is it permitted 
to separate these various aspects to the positive exclusion either of the procreative 
intention or of the conjugal relationship” [1956; L: 503] [6]. It is this “never” that 
increasingly split the official Church teaching from the intuitions and practice of so 
many of the people of God.
5. Vatican II
The Second Vatican Council is justly famous for its shift in style. It made no 
normative changes to official teaching on particular sexual practices. Rather it 
offered a strongly positive affirmation of both marriage and sexuality. Whereas, in 
the popular Catholic mind, the Church taught that sexuality was the locus of sin, 
now it became a locus of grace. The Council demonstrated this change of attitude 
when it wrote that sexual actions within marriage are “noble and worthy ones.. .. 
These actions signify and promote that mutual self-giving by which spouses enrich 
each other.” Shifting the emphasis from procreation, Gaudium et spes describes 
marriage as “the primary form of interpersonal communion,” a “community of 
love,” a “conjugal covenant,” and an “intimate partnership of married life and love” 
[1965: 12, 47, 48, 49] [7]. This married sexual love is affirmed as eminently human, 
involves the good of the whole person, and, most remarkably, merges the human 
with the divine. In this context, children are described as the “ultimate crown” of 
this married love and the “supreme gift of marriage” [1965: 48–50].
For most of its history, the Church did not understand sexual activity in terms 
of love. Now, without giving any explanation for the change, the Church insisted 
that sexual activity both expresses and perfects love [1965: 49]. To use colloquial 
language, spouses “make love.” Even more, this love is now described as a “total 
love” [1965: 49]. One might best appreciate the exuberance of these descriptions by 
contrasting them with that of Augustine, who encouraged spouses to give up sexual 
activity as soon as they were able, because sexual activity usually involves sin.26 
That advice makes little sense if sexual intercourse is “love-making.” In contrast, 
the Council said that sexual activity signifies and promotes mutual self-giving 
[1965: 49].
It is well known that Vatican Council II did not reaffirm the past teaching of 
primary and secondary ends. The Council fathers assert that the “other purposes of 
matrimony” should not be made “of less account.” Like previous popes, the Council 
insisted that both marriage and marital love are ordained toward children. It now 
elevates this role by proclaiming that through procreation parents participate in 
26 Augustine, The Good of Marriage, in Fathers of the Church [New York: Fathers of the Church, 1955], 
3.3.
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God’s own creative work; they cooperate with God’s own love in enlarging God’s 
family [1965: 50].
The Council fathers then took up the contentious question of “harmonizing 
conjugal love with the responsible transmission of life.” The underlying challenge 
was that of birth control. The phrase “transmission of life,” referring to the life of 
the species, reflects a biological perspective. The challenge was that many people 
had the experience that methods of birth control seemed to help spouses grow in 
conjugal love. As is well known, Paul VI decided that all the Council fathers, meet-
ing in solemn assembly, along with their expert theologians, were not qualified to 
make a decision on this topic. So constrained, the Council members simply recog-
nized that there are difficulties in the present era that make this harmony difficult. 
In an irenic, if naïve, fashion, they asserted that there cannot be any contradiction 
between these two natural inclinations, since God created both [1965: 51]. Breaking 
with a past attitude that encouraged large families, they recognized that there 
may be strong reasons to limit family size. They encouraged prospective parents 
to take into account a host of personal, social and historical factors in deciding the 
number of children [1965: 50]. The Council importantly affirms that it is the right 
of the parents to make this decision. However, these “responsible parenthood” 
decisions must include more than good intentions and should refer objectively to 
the “nature of the human person and his acts,” in the context of love [1965: 50]. 
Then, in a restrictive clause, it tells “sons of the Church”--thus not making a natural 
law claim--to avoid what the teaching authority might eventually determine to be 
blameworthy [1965:51].
6. Paul VI
The encyclical Humanae vitae by Paul VI summarized, solidified, and somewhat 
extended points that had been made earlier in more informal “addresses” by Pius 
XII and by Vatican II. In that sense, the teaching was not particularly new. Paul VI 
tried to preserve the same norms, while also honoring the more positive theology 
of Vatican II. Thus, he affirms, “husband and wife tend toward the mutual commu-
nion of their beings in view of personal perfection, to collaborate with God in the 
generation and education of new lives” [1968a: 8] [8]. Paul VI points out that, even 
if not fertile, sexual acts always remain “ordained to expressing and consolidating 
their union” [1968a: 11].
The pope then addressed the central question of the encyclical: whether there 
is a moral difference between natural family planning methods and other methods 
such as the “pill.” Humanae vitae masterfully acknowledges almost all the arguments 
made in favor of these other methods of birth control and against the old restric-
tions. Then he rejects these arguments on two grounds: the intrinsic evil criteria and 
the inseparability principle. The first subtly appeals to a sacrosanct character of sex, 
whose violation Aquinas thought was worse than sacrilege.27 The second appeals to 
the laudable goal of a fully integrated life. Both grounds deserve consideration.
First, it bears repeating that an intrinsically evil act is said to be wrong, no 
matter how much evil would be avoided or how much good would be achieved 
[1968a: 14]. Thus, on the one hand, any positive reason for using contraception is 
immediately cast into the framework of doing evil (sin) to bring about good. On the 
other hand, any suggestion that using contraception might avoid evil is shunted off 
and directed to spirituality considerations: it is better to suffer evil or death (with 
27 The Summa Theologica of Saint Thomas Aquinas [Westminster, MD: Christian Classics, 1948], 
I-II.154.12.
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Christ) than to do something wrong. In short, although Paul VI blesses human 
intelligence, which makes humans similar to God, he holds that this intelligence 
cannot be used to intervene to alter the biological sexual order established by God 
[1968a: 16]. Thus, even though “God has wisely disposed natural laws. .. which, of 
themselves, cause a separation” between sexual activity and procreation, that is, 
during most of the menstrual cycle, humans may not use their intelligence to do the 
same. Rather, “each and every marriage act must remain open to the transmission of 
life” [1968a: 11]. As is well known, such a claim was not widely persuasive. Taking 
a pill did not seem intrinsically evil to most people. In fact, it seemed prudent and 
loving. They agreed with Vatican II that sexual activity is holy in the sense that it 
cooperates with God, but they did not agree that it is sacred in the sense that it is off 
limits to human intervention.
Second, Paul VI reasserted the inseparability principle [1968a: 12]. Shifting from 
the teleological language of “purposes” or “ends,” he uses the word “meanings” 
(or “significations”), which point to an essential “nature.” The point is that sexual 
activity, abstractly, is the “kind” of activity that has a procreative “meaning.” This 
reference to kind of activity allows the procreative “meaning” to be honored even 
when no procreation is possible, that is, when the body itself is not “open to the 
transmission of life.” Contrary to at least one strand in John Paul II’s theology of the 
body, Paul VI does not demand that spouses be psychologically open to children. 
For Paul VI, there is no sin when spouses agree “in the positive will of avoiding 
children for plausible reasons, seeking the certainty that offspring will not arrive” 
[1968a: 16]. Rather “inseparability” forbids only actively doing something to cause 
infertility. Again, what God does (namely, separate fertility and union), humans 
may take advantage of; but humans may not actively do what God does [1968a: 11].
Paul VI nicely finessed the traditional teaching that husbands and wives have 
the right to use the body of their partners. He says that having rights over the body 
of another for sexual acts does not mean that one can impose a conjugal act on one’s 
partner. The Pope does not argue that marital rape would be a violation of rights 
(marriage remained a contract that gives to another rights over one’s own body); 
rather it is a violation of love, which is the new personalist criterion shaping the 
Church’s sexual and marital ethics [1968a: 13].
The Pontiff extended the Council’s teaching on love by describing it as a “special 
form of personal friendship, in which husband and wife generously share every-
thing without undue reservation” [1968a: 8]. This is an important addition, since 
previous teaching tended to treat love in a generic way, sometimes describing it 
simply as “spiritual and disinterested.” Because marriage is a special form of friend-
ship which is both bodily and interested, spousal love can allow or expect certain 
expressions of this love that are not permissible in other forms of friendship. Thus, 
the Church now offered a personalist argument for sexual exclusivity.
A week after Humanae vitae, Paul VI further embraced the “personalist concep-
tion” of married love [1968b; L: 1238]. Such love is “preeminent” in the subjective 
dimensions of marriage [1968b; L: 1238]. Paul describes it somewhat more carefully 
than his predecessors. It is “not a total fusion. Each personality remains distinct” 
[1970; L: 1235] [9]. This point balances out the frequent Church assertion, citing 
Genesis, that the two become one flesh. The latter assertion had been used as a basis 
for denying the independence of women within marriage. More expansively, Paul 
VI writes, “There is no married love that is not, in its exultation, an impulse toward 
the infinite, and that does not wish to be, in the impulse, total, faithful, exclusive 
and fecund” [1970; L: 1345; 1968a: 9]. As will be seen below, John Paul II will drop 
the qualifiers of “in its exultation,” “wish to be,” and “in the impulse.” For him, 
married love must be total, or else it is wrong. For Paul VI, conjugal chastity is a step 
by step process. He rebuffs the commonplace assumption that, after the marriage 
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ceremony, any sexual desire or practice is chaste. Rather, marital chastity is a life-
long process of integrating “manifold tendencies” [1970; L: 1362]. John Paul II will 
insist, with the idea of total love, that love must always be complete.
Not surprisingly, the new theology of marriage as a personal covenant created 
problems with the contract notion enshrined in the 1917 Code. Paul VI himself 
underscored the disjunction: “conjugal love” plays a “lofty and necessary role in 
marriage,” but it plays no role in the canonical law about marriage [1976; L: 1609] 
[10]. He spoke against those newcomers who make the “validity” of marriage 
dependent on the presence of love [1976; L: 1603]. Any lack of love among married 
persons affects not in the least the traditional teaching of the absolute impossibility 
of divorce. Hence, Paul VI insists, all that is needed for a valid marriage is the “indi-
visible moment” of consent [1976; L: 1606]. After saying “I do,” no other decision 
of the will or any absence of love can make the slightest difference in the validity of 
marriage [1976: L: 1606]. This legal logic hardly matched the messiness and the nar-
rative character of married life. The cognitive dissonance between official Church 
teaching and people’s experience of loveless marriages as well as life-giving second 
marriages led many people to abandon the Church.
The ecclesial consequences of Humanae vitae were enormous. They spring from 
two of the concerns that Haidt argues, as we saw, distinguish political and religious 
conservatives, namely, authority and loyalty. Coming at the time of an array of 
cultural world revolutions, Humanae vitae fractured the back of Church authority 
and divided Catholics. While Paul VI reaffirmed the tradition in order not to under-
mine Church authority, the result was the opposite. Many of the liberated Catholics 
insisted that they had to “follow their own conscience,” a teaching that had received 
some support in Vatican II but that also fed upon an expanding individualism. 
Mostly in vain, the defenders of Paul’s document pointed out that Vatican II’s 
affirmation of conscience was accompanied by restrictions such as the demand to 
be “submissive to Church’s teaching office,” the assertion of “objective standards,” 
the rejection of relying on sincere intentions, and the proscription of any “methods 
of regulating procreation which are found blameworthy by the teaching authority 
of the Church” [1965: 51]. Disagreement was often characterized as “dissent,” a 
term that unfortunately recast any debate from being a disagreement over truth to 
being disobedience to authority and a lack of loyalty to the Church. For many, the 
 disjunction was cataclysmic.
7. Congregation for the doctrine of the faith
During Paul VI’s tenure, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF), 
in its succinct “Declaration on Sexual Ethics,” charted new territory in understand-
ing the fundamental topic of sexuality itself, even as it resisted any changes in 
the norms for specific sexual behaviors that might flow from that understanding. 
Following developments in psychology, the Vatican asserts that sexuality “so 
profoundly” affects the human person that it is one of “the principal traits that 
distinguish” an individual’s life [1975: 1] [11]. Where the tradition had primarily 
focused sexuality on prolonging the human race, here sexuality is considered to be 
central to a person’s identity.
This acknowledgment brought new challenges because many people were 
engaging in expressing their sexual identity in ways that the Church disapproved. 
Hence, the CDF decried “erroneous opinions” and a “growing permissiveness” 
that contradicted the traditional norms. In spite of evidence of widespread uncer-
tainty and disagreement throughout much of the West, the Church declared that 
it “knows with certainty” that its own norms “are in complete harmony with the 
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Divine order of creation and with the spirit of Christ, and therefore also with 
human dignity” [1975: 13].
The CDF was quite explicit: its goal is “to repeat the Church’s doctrine” [1975: 6]. 
To understand the CDF’s response, it is helpful to recall what Haidt says about the 
human tendencies of both sides of an issue. “In moral matters, we. .. deploy our 
reasoning skills to support our team, and to demonstrate commitment to our team.” 
Haidt adds: “Conscious reasoning functions like a press secretary who automatically 
justifies any position taken by the president.” Haidt notes that all humans practice 
“confirmation bias,” which is “the tendency to seek out and interpret new evidence 
in ways that confirm what you already think.” At the same time, reason works hard 
to dismiss contrary evidence. In short, Haidt observes, “Moral matrices bind people 
together and blind them to the coherence, or even existence, of other matrices.”28
Thus, on the topic of masturbation, the CDF dismissively writes that “facts do 
not constitute a criterion for judging the moral value of human acts”[1975: 9]. It 
adds, “Whatever the force of certain arguments of a biological and philosophical 
nature,. .. both the Magisterium. .. and the moral sense of the faithful have declared 
without hesitation” that it is “an intrinsically and seriously disordered act” [1975: 
9]. In other words, contrary evidence does not affect the Church’s position. Taking 
loyalty for granted, the CDF presumes that the faithful’s attitude is in agreement, so 
no further evidence of that support is needed. Put another way, if any of the faith-
ful were to hesitate or disagree, then they are not among the “faithful.” Finally, the 
CDF, after admitting that no text of scripture condemns masturbation, asserts that 
“the tradition of the Church has rightly understood it to be condemned in the New 
Testament.” Even if it is not there, it is there.
The CDF acknowledged that many psychologists were arguing that masturba-
tion “is a normal phenomenon of sexual development, especially among the young” 
[1975: 9]. This appeal to development presented a new kind of challenge, namely, 
an activity might be appropriate at an early stage of life, even if it is not appropriate 
for adults. For example, some taught that it was a matter of indifference that young 
children fondle their own genitals. But in Church teaching this would objectively be 
one of the worst sexual sins possible (although subjectively innocent). That is, these 
act would be objectively evil since in children there is neither any possibility of pro-
creation nor any sense of unity with another person. The response of the CDF was 
not to undertake the task of inserting a developmental understanding of sexuality. 
Rather, the CDF shifted the argument. It notes that many people who masturbate 
do not have the freedom to be fully responsible for sexually sinning [1975: 9–10]. 
This approach preserves the norm that the child’s act is objectively a grave matter, 
but it offers the relief that in children there is no personal guilt.
Not surprisingly, the CDF also rejected premarital sex. It upholds the traditional 
standard, saying, “every genital act must be within the framework of marriage” 
[1975: 7]. It explains that nonmarried persons “cannot ensure, in sincerity and 
fidelity, the interpersonal relationship between a man and a woman” [1975: 7]. It is 
noteworthy that the Congregation appeals to personalist values. Unfortunately, this 
approach overlooks that marriage itself cannot guarantee interpersonal stability, as 
divorce statistics indicate. Only a contract theory, claimed to be from God and both 
unalterable and unbreakable, keeps marriage technically stable even when in all 
other ways the interpersonal relationship has died.
The CDF next took up the topic of homosexuality, which had scarcely been 
present in earlier twentieth century Church teaching but was now being positively 
assessed in the psychological sciences. Social acceptance of homosexuality was 
gradually increasing since sexuality was now considered part of one’s very identity. 
28 Haidt, The Righteous Mind, 79–80, 91, 110.
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The CDF, at this point in history, generally understood homosexuality as a pathol-
ogy due to some incurable instinct or condition. It insists that “homosexual acts are 
intrinsically disordered and can in no case be approved” [1975: 8]. Even if homo-
sexuals are incurable, they ought not act with their limitations.
Finally, the CDF had to deal with a new challenge raised by theologians who said 
that many people who engage in prohibited sexual actions may be acting wrongly, 
but they may not be drastically separated from God. It seemed highly implausible to 
these critics that, say, an adolescent boy who on one occasion freely enjoyed sexual 
fantasies was fit for damnation. To this, the CDF repeated the seventeenth century 
declaration that all sexual sins, no matter how slight they may seem, are objectively 
serious sins [1975: 10]. The plausibility of Church teaching grew thinner.
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